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Abstract
Problem/Condition: Since 1971, CDC, the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, and the Council of
State and Territorial Epidemiologists have maintained a collaborative surveillance system for collecting and
periodically reporting data related to occurrences and causes of waterborne-disease outbreaks (WBDOs).
This surveillance system is the primary source of data concerning the scope and effects of waterborne
disease outbreaks on persons in the United States.
Reporting Period Covered: This summary includes data on WBDOs associated with drinking water that
occurred during January 2001--December 2002 and on three previously unreported outbreaks that occurred
during 2000.
Description of the System: Public health departments in the states, territories, localities, and the Freely
Associated States are primarily responsible for detecting and investigating WBDOs and voluntarily
reporting them to CDC on a standard form. The surveillance system includes data for outbreaks associated
with both drinking water and recreational water; only outbreaks associated with drinking water are reported

in this summary.
Results: During 2001--2002, a total of 31 WBDOs associated with drinking water were reported by 19
states. These 31 outbreaks caused illness among an estimated 1,020 persons and were linked to seven
deaths. The microbe or chemical that caused the outbreak was identified for 24 (77.4%) of the 31 outbreaks.
Of the 24 identified outbreaks, 19 (79.2%) were associated with pathogens, and five (20.8%) were
associated with acute chemical poisonings. Five outbreaks were caused by norovirus, five by parasites, and
three by non-Legionella bacteria. All seven outbreaks involving acute gastrointestinal illness of unknown
etiology were suspected of having an infectious cause. For the first time, this MMWR Surveillance Summary
includes drinking water-associated outbreaks of Legionnaires disease (LD); six outbreaks of LD occurred
during 2001--2002. Of the 25 non-Legionella associated outbreaks, 23 (92.0%) were reported in systems
that used groundwater sources; nine (39.1%) of these 23 groundwater outbreaks were associated with
private noncommunity wells that were not regulated by EPA.
Interpretation: The number of drinking water-associated outbreaks decreased from 39 during 1999--2000
to 31 during 2001--2002. Two (8.0%) outbreaks associated with surface water occurred during 2001--2002;
neither was associated with consumption of untreated water. The number of outbreaks associated with
groundwater sources decreased from 28 during 1999--2000 to 23 during 2001--2002; however, the
proportion of such outbreaks increased from 73.7% to 92.0%. The number of outbreaks associated with
untreated groundwater decreased from 17 (44.7%) during 1999--2000 to 10 (40.0%) during 2001--2002.
Outbreaks associated with private, unregulated wells remained relatively stable, although more outbreaks
involving private, treated wells were reported during 2001--2002. Because the only groundwater systems
that are required to disinfect their water supplies are public systems under the influence of surface water,
these findings support EPA's development of a groundwater rule that specifies when corrective action
(including disinfection) is required.
Public Health Action: CDC and EPA use surveillance data 1) to identify the types of water systems, their
deficiencies, and the etiologic agents associated with outbreaks and 2) to evaluate the adequacy of
technologies for providing safe drinking water. Surveillance data are used also to establish research
priorities, which can lead to improved water-quality regulations. CDC and EPA recently completed
epidemiologic studies that assess the level of waterborne illness attributable to municipal drinking water in
nonoutbreak conditions. The decrease in outbreaks in surface water systems is attributable primarily to
implementation of provisions of EPA rules enacted since the late 1980s. Rules under development by EPA
are expected to protect the public further from microbial contaminants while addressing risk tradeoffs of
disinfection byproducts in drinking water.

Introduction
During 1920--1970, statistical data regarding U.S. waterborne-disease outbreaks (WBDOs) were collected
by different researchers and federal agencies (1). Since 1971, CDC, the U.S. Environmental Protection
Agency (EPA), and the Council of State and Territorial Epidemiologists (CSTE) have maintained a
collaborative surveillance system that tracks the occurrences and causes of WBDOs associated with
drinking water; tabulation of recreational water-associated outbreaks was added to the surveillance system
in 1978 (2--7). The surveillance system includes data regarding outbreaks associated with drinking water,
recreational water, and other types of water exposures. This MMWR Surveillance Summary includes data for
drinking water-associated outbreaks that occurred during 2001--2002 and for three previously unreported
outbreaks that occurred in 2000. Recreational water-associated outbreaks are presented in a separate MMWR
Surveillance Summary (8).
These surveillance activities are intended to 1) characterize the epidemiology of WBDOs; 2) identify
changing trends in the etiologic agents that caused WBDOs and determine why the outbreaks occurred; 3)

encourage public health personnel to detect and investigate WBDOs; and 4) foster collaboration among
local, state, federal, and international agencies on initiatives to prevent waterborne disease transmission.
Data obtained through this surveillance system are useful for identifying major deficiencies in providing
safe drinking water. Surveillance information can influence research priorities and lead to improved waterquality regulations. However, the statistics reported in this surveillance summary represent only a portion of
the burden of illness associated with drinking water exposure. The surveillance information does not include
endemic waterborne disease risks, nor are reliable estimates available of the number of unrecognized
WBDOs and associated cases of illness.

Background
EPA Drinking Water Regulations
Public water systems are regulated under the Safe Drinking Water Act (SDWA) of 1974 and its subsequent
1986 and 1996 amendments (Table 1) (9--11). SDWA authorizes EPA to set national standards to protect
drinking water and its sources against naturally occurring or human-made contaminants. Microbial
contamination is regulated under the Total Coliform Rule (TCR), Surface Water Treatment Rule (SWTR),
Interim Enhanced SWTR (IESWTR), and Long Term 1 Enhanced SWTR (LT1ESWTR). In addition, EPA's
lead, copper, and arsenic rules prescribe action levels at which a system must take corrective steps (12,13).
These rules have been described previously (2).
All public water systems are required by TCR to monitor for total coliforms at a prescribed frequency
(14,15). SWTR (16) and IESWTR (17) apply to public systems that serve >10,000 persons and that use
surface water or groundwater under the direct influence of surface water and are intended to protect the
public against exposure to Giardia intestinalis, Cryptosporidium, viruses, Legionella, and selected other
pathogens. LT1ESWTR applies to public systems that serve <10,000 persons and is intended to improve the
control of microbial pathogens, especially Cryptosporidium (18,19). An additional regulation, the Filter
Backwash Recycling Rule, requires the return of recycle flows to the water treatment process so microbial
contaminant removal is not compromised (19,20).
Recently proposed microbial and disinfection byproducts regulations include the Long Term 2 Enhanced
Surface Water Treatment Rule (LT2ESWTR) and the Stage 2 Disinfectants and Disinfection Byproducts
Rule (DBPR). These regulations were developed simultaneously to address risk tradeoffs between control of
pathogens and limiting exposure to disinfection byproducts (DBPs) that can form in water from the
disinfection process used to control microbial pathogens (21).
LT2ESWTR (22,23) mandates source-water monitoring for Cryptosporidium and additional treatment for
filtered systems on the basis of source-water concentrations; inactivation of Cryptosporidium by all
unfiltered systems; disinfection profiling and benchmarking to ensure continued levels of microbial
protection while system operators take steps to comply with new DBP limits; and covering, treating, or
implementing a risk-management plan for uncovered finished water-storage facilities.
DBPR applies to all community and nontransient, noncommunity water systems that add a disinfectant
other than ultraviolet light (24). DBPR requires systems to meet maximum contaminant levels at each
monitoring site in the distribution system, determine if they are experiencing short-term peaks in DBP
levels, and better identify monitoring sites at which consumers are exposed to high DBP levels.
The 1996 amendments require EPA to develop regulations that mandate disinfection of groundwater
systems as necessary to protect the public health. The proposed Ground Water Rule (GWR) (information
available at http://www.epa.gov/safewater/gwr.html) will specify when corrective action, including
disinfection, is required to protect consumers from bacteria and viruses (25). Proposed requirements include

periodic sanitary surveys to identify deficiencies, hydrogeologic sensitivity assessments for undisinfected
systems, source-water microbial monitoring from certain systems, and compliance monitoring for systems
that disinfect to ensure adequate inactivation or removal of viruses. SDWA's Wellhead Protection Program
requires every state to develop a program to delineate wellhead protection areas in which sources of
contamination are managed to minimize groundwater contamination (25). Additional protection of
groundwater sources, especially from contamination by shallow wells and cesspools, is provided by the
Underground Injection Control Regulations (26).
Every 5 years, EPA is also required to publish a list of contaminants that are known or anticipated to occur
in public water systems and that might need to be regulated. The first drinking water Contaminant
Candidate List (CCL) was issued in 1998 and included 50 chemical and 10 microbial contaminants (27);
however, EPA decided not to regulate any of the waterborne pathogens included in CCL. EPA also must
establish criteria for a program to monitor unregulated contaminants and publish a list of contaminants to be
monitored (28--30). Microorganisms were included among the contaminants for which analytical methods
are available (Aeromonas) and contaminants for which analytical methods are being developed
(Helicobacter pylori, cyanobacteria, coxsackieviruses, microsporidia, adenoviruses, and caliciviruses). An
ongoing screening survey for Aeromonas, and selected chemical contaminants will help determine whether
these should be considered or excluded for regulation.

Methods
Data Sources
Public health departments in the states, territories, localities, and the Freely Associated States* (FAS) have
primary responsibility for detecting and investigating WBDOs, which they report voluntarily to CDC by
using a standard form (CDC form 52.12, available at http://www.cdc.gov/healthyswimming/downloads
/cdc_5212_waterborne.pdf). The form solicits data on characteristics of the outbreak, including person,
place, time, and location; results from epidemiologic studies conducted; specimen and water sample testing;
and other factors potentially contributing to the outbreak (e.g., environmental concerns, disinfection, and
filtration [Glossary]). CDC annually requests reports from state, territorial, and FAS epidemiologists or
persons designated as WBDO surveillance coordinators and obtains additional information regarding water
quality and treatment as needed. Numeric and text data are abstracted from the outbreak form and
supporting documents and entered into a database for analysis.
Definitions†
The unit of analysis for the WBDO surveillance system is an outbreak, not an individual case of a
waterborne disease. Two criteria must be met for an event to be defined as a drinking water-associated
disease outbreak. First, >2 persons must have experienced a similar illness after exposure to water. This
criterion is waived for single cases of laboratory-confirmed primary amebic meningoencephalitis (PAM)
and for single cases of chemical poisoning if water-quality data indicate contamination by the chemical.
Second, epidemiologic evidence must implicate drinking water as the probable source of the illness.
Reported outbreaks caused by contaminated water or ice at the point of use (e.g., a contaminated water
faucet or serving container) are not classified as drinking water-associated outbreaks, and WBDOs
associated with cruise ships are not summarized in this report.
Different types of drinking water systems are used for outbreak classification (Figure 1). Public water
systems, which are classified as either community or noncommunity systems (Glossary), are regulated
under SDWA. Of the approximately 161,000 public water systems in the United States, 108,000 (67.1%) are
noncommunity systems, including 88,000 transient systems and 20,000 nontransient systems (Glossary),

and 53,000 (32.9%) are community systems. Despite representing a minority of water systems, community
systems serve 273 million persons (approximately 93.9% of the U.S. population) (31). Furthermore, a
limited number of community systems (3,900 [7.4%]) provide water to 81% of the community system
population (31). Noncommunity, nontransient systems provide water to 6.3 million persons, and 23.3
million persons use noncommunity, transient systems (by definition, these populations also use another type
of water system at their residences, except for the limited number of permanent residents of nontransient
systems) (31). Although the majority of public water systems (90.9%) are supplied by groundwater, more
persons (66.2%) drink from public systems served by surface water. Approximately 17 million persons
(6.0%) rely on private, individual water systems (31) (Glossary).
In this surveillance system, drinking water-associated outbreaks involving water not intended for drinking
(e.g., lakes, springs, and creeks used by campers and boaters; irrigation water, and other nonpotable sources
with or without taps) are also classified as individual systems (Glossary). Sources used for bottled water are
also classified as individual systems; bottled water is not regulated by EPA but is subject to regulation by
the Food and Drug Administration (FDA).
Each drinking water system associated with a WBDO is classified as having a deficiency. Deficiency
classifications are as follows:
1: untreated surface water;
2: untreated groundwater;
3: treatment deficiency (e.g., temporary interruption of disinfection, chronically inadequate
disinfection, or inadequate or no filtration);
4: distribution system deficiency (e.g., cross-connection, contamination of water mains during
construction or repair, or contamination of a storage facility); and
5: unknown or miscellaneous deficiency (e.g., contaminated bottled water or water source not
intended for drinking, such as irrigation water).
Outbreak Classification
WBDOs reported to the surveillance system are classified according to the strength of the evidence
implicating water as the vehicle of transmission (Table 2). The classification scheme (i.e., Classes I--IV) is
based on the epidemiologic and water-quality data provided on the outbreak report form. Epidemiologic
data are weighted more than water-quality data. Although outbreaks without water-quality data might be
included in this summary, reports that lack epidemiologic data were excluded. Single cases of PAM or
chemical poisoning are not classified according to this scheme. Weighting of epidemiologic data does not
preclude the relative importance of both types of data. The purpose of the outbreak system is not only to
implicate water as the vehicle for the outbreak but also to understand the circumstances and system
breakdowns that led to the outbreak.
A classification of I indicates that adequate epidemiologic and water-quality data were reported (Table 2).
However, the classification does not necessarily imply that an investigation was conducted optimally, nor
does a classification of II, III, or IV imply that an investigation was inadequate or incomplete. Outbreaks
and the resulting investigations occur under different circumstances, and not all outbreaks can or should be
rigorously investigated. In addition, outbreaks that affect fewer persons are more likely to receive a
classification of III rather than I because of the relatively limited sample size available for analysis.
For the reporting period 2001--2002, WBDOs associated with drinking water and with recreational water
are reported separately for the first time. The MMWR Surveillance Summary of recreational waterassociated outbreaks (8) includes WBDOs related to recreational water as defined in the methods section of
that summary. This MMWR Surveillance Summary includes waterborne outbreaks related to drinking water,

those occurring in occupational settings, those associated with Legionella species, and other miscellaneous
outbreaks.
Although outbreaks of Pontiac fever have been included in previous MMWR Surveillance Summaries of
WBDOs, this summary is the first to include outbreaks of Legionnaires disease (LD). Because nearly all
outbreaks attributed to Legionella species share characteristics that are distinct from other types of WBDOs,
all Legionella outbreaks have been compiled into a single table in this report that identifies the primary use
of the water implicated in the outbreak. Although all Legionella outbreaks are listed in this table, only those
that occurred in association with water primarily intended for drinking or occupational use are discussed in
this summary. Outbreaks of LD that occurred in association with water intended primarily for recreational
use are discussed in the summary of recreational water-associated outbreaks (8).
Because the parameters used in this summary to assess drinking water-associated outbreaks (i.e., water
system type, water source, and deficiency) do not permit adequate evaluation of the characteristics
associated with Legionella outbreaks, such parameters are not applied to Legionella outbreaks. For this
reason, Legionella outbreaks are counted not in tables and statistics that include these parameters, but only
in those related to the total number of drinking water outbreaks and the etiologic agent of these outbreaks.

Results
During 2001--2002, a total of 31 outbreaks (19 during 2001 and 12 during 2002) associated with drinking
water were reported by 19 states (Figure 2) compared with 39 outbreaks during 1999--2000 (Figures 3 and
4). (Selected case descriptions are located in the Appendix). These 31 outbreaks caused illness among an
estimated 1,020 persons, resulting in 51 hospitalizations and seven deaths. The median number of persons
affected in an outbreak was six (range: 2--230). Outbreaks peaked during June--September (Figure 5).
Florida reported the most outbreaks (eight) during this reporting period.
On the basis of epidemiologic and water-quality data, nine (29.0%) of the 31 outbreaks were assigned to
Class I, two (6.5%) to Class II, 19 (61.3%) to Class III, and one (3.2%) to Class IV. Outbreaks were
analyzed by state (Tables 3, 4, and 5) and tabulated by etiologic agent and water system type (Table 6), type
of deficiency and water system (Table 7), and type of deficiency and water source (Table 8). Outbreaks
attributable to Legionella are excluded from the analysis of outbreaks by etiologic agent, water system, amd
type of deficiency.
Etiologic Agents
Of the 31 outbreaks, 19 (61.3%) were of known infectious etiology, seven (22.6%) were of unknown
etiology, and five (16.1%) were attributed to chemical poisoning. The outbreaks of known infectious
etiology included six (19.4%) that were caused by Legionella species, five (16.1%) by viruses, five (16.1%)
by parasites, and three (9.7%) by bacteria other than Legionella species (Figure 6).
Unidentified Etiologic Agents
Seven outbreaks affecting 117 persons were reported that involved acute gastrointestinal illness of unknown
etiology (AGI); no hospitalizations or deaths resulted from these illnesses. Stool specimen testing to identify
a causative agent was attempted in only one of these outbreaks. In another of these outbreaks, norovirus was
suspected on the basis of symptoms and incubation period in an outbreak of gastrointestinal illness at a
church camp in Pennsylvania. However, no confirmatory testing was done of patient samples or of the
implicated water. No suspected etiologic agent was noted for any of the other outbreaks in this category.
Legionella Species

Six outbreaks were attributed to Legionella species. These are described on page 33 of this report.
Viruses
Five outbreaks affecting 727 persons were attributed to viral infections, all attributed to norovirus. Of the
six outbreaks affecting the most persons reported in this summary, five were caused by norovirus. Illnesses
from these five outbreaks resulted in two hospitalizations and one death.
Parasites
Five outbreaks affecting 30 persons were attributed to parasitic infection: three Giardia intestinalis
outbreaks, one Cryptosporidium outbreak, and one Naegleria fowleri outbreak. Illnesses from these
outbreaks resulted in five hospitalizations and two deaths; both deaths were caused by N. fowleri infection.
Chemicals
Five outbreaks affecting 39 persons were attributed to chemical contamination. Two were caused by high
levels of copper and a third by high levels of copper and other metals. One outbreak was caused by ethylene
glycol contamination of a school's water supply and one by ethyl benzene, toluene, and xylene
contamination of bottled water. Illnesses from these five outbreaks resulted in no hospitalizations or deaths.
Bacteria (Other Than Legionella Species)
Three outbreaks affecting 27 persons were attributed to bacterial infection (other than Legionella species):
one Escherichia coli O157: H7 outbreak, one Campylobacter jejuni outbreak, and an outbreak involving
infection with two different bacteria (of 12 clinically ill persons, six tested positive for C. jejuni and one
tested positive for Yersinia enterocolitica). Illnesses from these three outbreaks resulted in three
hospitalizations and no deaths.
Water-Quality Data
Water-quality data (i.e., information regarding the presence of coliform bacteria, pathogens, or chemical
contaminants or data regarding levels of disinfectants such as chlorine) were available for 29 (93.5%) of the
31 outbreaks. Among the 26 outbreaks with a suspected or confirmed infectious etiology, 24 (92.3%)
provided bacterial water-quality testing data; a positive total or fecal coliform result from the implicated
water was reported for 14 (58.3%) of these 24, including 10 (58.8%) of the 17 outbreaks of confirmed
infectious etiology, and four (57.1%) of the seven outbreaks of suspected infectious etiology (i.e., AGI). The
etiologic organism that caused the outbreak was recovered from the implicated water in 10 (41.7%) of these
24 outbreaks; however, these were the only 10 outbreaks that were tested specifically for the causative
microorganism. Legionella species were detected in the implicated water in all six outbreaks caused by this
organism, and etiologic organisms were also recovered from an outbreak of N. fowleri in Arizona (October
2002), from an outbreak of C. jejuni in Wisconsin (January 2001), and from two outbreaks of norovirus in
Wyoming (January 2001 and September 2001).
All five reports of outbreaks of chemical etiology provided water-quality data. In four of these outbreaks,
the contaminant that caused the outbreak was recovered directly from the implicated water, including
copper in two outbreaks (Minnesota, November 2001 and Ohio, September 2001), copper and seven other
metals in one outbreak (Minnesota, September 2001) and ethyl benzene, toluene, and xylene in one
outbreak (Florida, September 2001). The contaminant was not recovered from the tested water in an
outbreak (Florida, August 2001) that resulted from ethylene glycol contamination caused by a crossconnection during an improperly performed air-conditioning system repair. However, the sample was

collected >24 hours after the contaminating event, and a high degree of clinical suspicion of the
contaminating agent existed on the basis of the appearance and smell of the water and on the description of
the mechanical error.
Water Systems and Water Sources
Because outbreaks caused by Legionella species are not included in statistics resulting from parameters that
describe water systems and water sources, they are excluded from this section. The 25 remaining drinking
water outbreaks serve as the focus of these parameters.
Seven (28.0%) of these 25 outbreaks were associated with community systems, eight (32.0%) with
noncommunity systems, and ten (40.0%) with individual water systems (Tables 6 and 7) (Figure 6). Of the
25 outbreaks, 23 (92.0%) were associated with groundwater sources, including 21 involving wells: one
outbreak involved water derived from both a well and spring, and one involved bottled spring water. Two
(8.0%) of the 25 outbreaks were associated with surface water that derived from a river or stream.
Among the seven outbreaks associated with community water systems, one (14.3%) was caused by
contaminated, untreated groundwater; one (14.3%) was related to a treatment deficiency; and four (57.1%)
were related to problems in the water distribution system. One (14.3%) community outbreak of an unknown
deficiency resulted in 71 cases of illness when participants at a golf tournament consumed contaminated
water and ice. The number of illnesses in the other outbreaks varied (range: 2--28).
Among the eight outbreaks associated with noncommunity water systems, four (50.0%) were caused by
contaminated, untreated groundwater; two (25.0%) were related to treatment deficiencies; one (12.5%) was
related to a problem in the water distribution system; and one (12.5%) had an unknown deficiency.
Among the 10 outbreaks associated with individual water systems, five (50.0%) were caused by
contaminated, untreated groundwater; four (40.0%) were related to treatment deficiencies; and one (10.0%)
had an unknown deficiency. These outbreaks affected limited populations (range: 2--13 cases).
All three of the bacterial (other than Legionella species) outbreaks occurred in association with groundwater
systems (all were untreated wells). Four (80.0%) of the five parasitic outbreaks occurred in association with
groundwater systems: two were associated with untreated wells; one occurred after the homeowners
intentionally bypassed a reverse osmosis system that had run out of treated water; and one was associated
with a distribution deficiency in a treated well/spring combination source. All five viral outbreaks occurred
in association with groundwater systems: three were associated with untreated wells; one was related to a
treatment deficiency in a chlorinated well; and one had an unknown deficiency. Four (80.0%) of the five
chemical outbreaks occurred in association with groundwater systems: three were related to distribution
system deficiencies in well water, and one was related to an unknown deficiency in a bottled water product
that had a spring as its source. All seven outbreaks of unknown etiology were linked to groundwater
systems: four were associated with treatment deficiencies of chlorinated wells, and three were associated
with unknown deficiencies in wells (one chlorinated and two untreated).
Among the 23 outbreaks related to groundwater systems, 10 (43.5%) were linked to consumption of
untreated groundwater, six (26.1%) were associated with treatment deficiencies; four (17.4%) were linked
to deficiencies in the distribution system; and three (13.0%) had unknown deficiencies (Table 8). Among
the two outbreaks related to surface water systems, one (50.0%) was caused by a treatment deficiency and
one (50.0%) by a distribution system deficiency.
Outbreaks Caused by Legionella species

Drinking Water Legionella Outbreaks
During 2001--2002, six Legionella outbreaks were related to water systems in which the primary water use
at the outbreak site was for drinking (Table 5). These outbreaks caused illness in 80 persons and resulted in
41 hospitalizations and four deaths. The predominant clinical syndrome in all six outbreaks was
Legionnaires disease, although in one outbreak involving a government building complex in Vermont (July
2002), six (21.4%) of the 28 ill persons had symptoms consistent with the case definition for Pontiac fever.
All of these outbreaks occurred in large buildings or institutional settings and were related to multiplication
of Legionella species in the respective distribution systems.
Other Legionella Outbreaks
One Legionella outbreak was related to a water system in which the primary water use at the outbreak site
was recreational (Table 5); this outbreak is discussed elsewhere (8). One Legionella outbreak occurred in an
occupational setting and is discussed in the following section. Another Legionella outbreak occurred in
Tennessee in April 2002 (32) (Appendix) when patrons of a restaurant experienced Pontiac fever in
association with sitting near a particular fountain in the restaurant. Cultures from the fountain were positive
for L. anisa. No foods or other exposures were associated with illness, and the restaurant's air conditioning
system was negative for Legionella species on laboratory testing. This outbreak caused illness in 117
persons and led to one hospitalization.
Outbreaks Associated with Occupational Exposure to Water
Two outbreaks associated with exposure to water in an occupational setting were reported during
2001--2002. In November 2002, a worker at a wastewater treatment plant in California fell into an
equalization basin containing untreated wastewater and subsequently contracted giardiasis. A coworker
subsequently experienced gastrointestinal symptoms, although his illness went undiagnosed. In March
2001, an outbreak of Legionnaires disease occurred at an automotive plant in Ohio (33) in which contact
with the cleaning area of the plant (particularly one cleaning line) was associated with disease. As a result of
this outbreak, 17 persons became ill, two of whom died.
Previously Unreported Outbreaks
Reports of three previously unreported drinking water outbreaks that occurred during 2000 were received
during this reporting period (Table 9). An outbreak of cryptosporidiosis occurred in Florida in December
2000 when a groundwater system experienced a main break days before the first of a cluster of five cases of
gastrointestinal illness. Cryptosporidium was subsequently identified in a stool specimen from one of these
patients. Reports of outbreaks of norovirus (Kansas, June 2000) and cholera (Marshall Islands, December
2000) were also received during this reporting period (Appendix).
Outbreaks Not Classified as WBDOs
Epidemiologic evidence from four additional outbreaks that were reported as potentially associated with
drinking water during 2001--2002 was insufficient to warrant counting these outbreaks as WBDOs.
However, because of their potential links to drinking water, a brief description of these outbreaks follows.
In June 2002, an outbreak of diarrheal illness occurred among 38 climbers of Mt. Denali in Alaska; illness
lasted a mean of 2 days (range: 1--5 days), and the attack rate of climbers was 27% during the 3-day study
period. The hypothesized cause was use of fecally contaminated snow as a drinking water source, but this
was not associated with illness in a cohort study that was performed during the outbreak.

In June 2002, two persons in a Florida household supplied by an untreated well experienced recurring oral
lesions and pharyngitis. A third person in the household who did not drink from this water source remained
asymptomatic. Although the well water was positive for fecal coliforms, no other epidemiologic evidence
linked the drinking water to illness.
In June 2002, >77 rafters on the Colorado River in Grand Canyon National Park in Arizona became ill with
diarrhea and other gastrointestinal symptoms. Norovirus was isolated from stool specimens of seven
(53.8%) of the 13 persons tested. Although norovirus was identified in samples of river water and water
from a sewage treatment plant that emptied into the river, these were not the same strains identified in the
stool samples. However, a weak association was identified between drinking river water and illness, and no
other exposures (e.g., food contamination or asymptomatic carriers) were associated with illness.
In April 2000, an outbreak of cholera that sickened approximately 3,500 persons and caused 20 deaths
began on Pohnpei Island in the Federated States of Micronesia. No information is available as to the cause
of the outbreak or the risk factors for illness.

Discussion
Considerations Regarding Reported Results
The WBDO surveillance system provides information concerning epidemiologic and etiologic trends in
outbreaks related to drinking water. However, not all outbreaks are recognized, investigated, or reported to
CDC or EPA, and studies have not been performed that assess the sensitivity of this system. Furthermore,
outbreaks occurring in national parks, tribal lands, or military bases might not be reported to state or local
authorities. For these reasons, the true incidence of WBDOs is probably greater than is reflected in
surveillance system data. Multiple factors influence whether WBDOs are recognized and investigated by
local or state public health agencies, including public awareness of the outbreak, availability of laboratory
testing, requirements for reporting diseases, and resources available to local health departments for
surveillance and investigation of probable outbreaks. In addition, because changes in the capacity of local
and state public health agencies and laboratories to detect an outbreak might result in reporting and
surveillance bias, the states with the majority of outbreaks reported during this period might not be the
states in which the majority of outbreaks actually occurred. An increase or a decrease in the number of
outbreaks reported might reflect either an actual increase or decrease in outbreaks or a change in sensitivity
of surveillance practices. As with any passive surveillance system, accuracy of the data depends greatly on
the reporting agencies (i.e., state, local, and territorial health departments). Thus, independent of the
recognition or investigation of a given outbreak, reporting bias can also influence the final data.
Outbreaks most likely to be recognized and investigated are those involving acute illness characterized by a
short incubation period, serious illness or symptoms requiring medical treatment, or recognized etiologies
for which laboratory methods have become more sensitive or widely available. Increased reporting often
occurs as etiologies become better recognized, water system deficiencies are identified, and state
surveillance activities and laboratory capabilities increase (34--36). Recommendations for improving
WBDO investigations include increased laboratory support for clinical and water analyses, enhanced
surveillance activities, and assessment of sources of potential bias (37--39).
The identification of the etiologic agent of a WBDO depends on the timely recognition of the outbreak so
appropriate clinical and environmental samples can be collected. Additionally, the laboratory involved must
have the capability to test for an organism to detect it. For example, routine testing of stool specimens at
laboratories include tests for the presence of enteric bacterial pathogens and might also include an ova and
parasite examination. However, Cryptosporidium species, among the most commonly reported waterborne

pathogens, are often not included in standard ova and parasite examinations and thus should be specifically
requested (40). Additionally, although norovirus testing is being performed more commonly, testing for
other viral agents is rarely done. Finally, collection of water-quality data depends primarily on local and
state statutory requirements, the availability of investigative personnel, and the technical capacity of the
laboratories that test the water.
One key limitation of the data collected as part of the WBDO surveillance system is that the information
collected pertains only to outbreaks of waterborne illness rather than endemic waterborne illness. The
epidemiologic trends and water-quality concerns observed in outbreaks might not necessarily reflect or
correspond with trends associated with endemic waterborne illness. CDC and EPA have recently completed
a series of epidemiologic studies designed to assess the magnitude of endemic waterborne illness associated
with consumption of municipal drinking water. A joint report on the results of these studies is forthcoming.
Drinking Water Outbreaks Caused by Legionella species
Of the 31 drinking water-associated outbreaks that occurred during 2001--2002, six (19.4%) were caused by
Legionella species, which was the single most commonly identified etiologic agent. Because this is the first
time that LD outbreaks have been included in the MMWR Surveillance Summary of WBDOs, no
comparative data are available from previous reporting periods. LD outbreaks tended to result in higher
morbidity and mortality than the majority of other outbreaks reported (as evidenced by the hospitalization
and case-fatality rates) and differed epidemiologically from other drinking water outbreaks. They fit
patterns usually seen with Legionella (i.e., they all occurred in large buildings or institutional settings, were
related to amplification of Legionella species in the respective distribution systems, and were most likely
spread by aerosolization of water from these systems). Contamination of source water is less likely to lead
to outbreaks involving this organism. These outbreaks underscore the importance of remaining vigilant
about the possibility of Legionella species in any building complex and the need to take measures that
address this threat (e.g., maintaining hot water temperatures of >124ºF [return temperature]/>140ºF [storage
temperature] and cold water storage and distribution temperatures <68ºF, testing for this organism when
outbreaks of respiratory disease or febrile illness occur in these settings, and maintaining adequate
disinfectant levels as appropriate) (41,42).
Drinking Water Outbreaks (Excluding Those Caused by Legionella species)
Because of the different epidemiology of Legionella outbreaks and because LD outbreaks have not been
included in previous summaries, they will not be discussed in the following sections, which address the
remaining 25 drinking water outbreaks that occurred during 2001--2002. These 25 outbreaks represent a
35.9% decrease from the 39 outbreaks reported during 1999--2000 (2), which was the highest total reported
in 8 years (2--7). Seasonality of drinking water outbreaks remained consistent with previous years, with the
highest number of outbreaks reported during June--September.
The number of reported outbreaks began to decrease sharply beginning with the 1985--1986 reporting
period; this was attributable primarily to fewer community and noncommunity outbreaks. With institution
and enforcement of better regulations that chiefly affect these types of water systems (particularly
community systems), a marked drop in the number of outbreaks was seen. In contrast, the increase in
outbreaks reported during 1999--2000 was attributable primarily to individual water systems, which affect
fewer persons, are less regulated, and are more subject to changes in surveillance and reporting. The relative
proportion of community, noncommunity, and individual outbreaks during 2001--2002 was more consistent
with historic norms, as was the total number of outbreaks.
During 2001--2002, Florida reported the highest number of outbreaks (eight), as was the case during

1999--2000, when 15 outbreaks were reported. The only other state to report >2 drinking water-associated
outbreaks during 2001--2002 was Minnesota, with three outbreaks. Reports of these outbreaks might reflect
enhanced surveillance activities rather than a true increase in WBDO incidence; six outbreaks in Florida
during 2001--2002 and 14 during 1999--2000 occurred in a single county and were investigated by the same
epidemiologist. Among the five most populous states (California, Florida, Illinois, New York, and Texas),
only Florida reported >1 drinking water-associated outbreak; California and Texas reported none, and
Illinois and New York each reported one. Similarly, in the 2001--2002 summary of recreational waterassociated outbreaks (8), Florida and Minnesota reported more recreational water-associated outbreaks than
any other state (seven and nine, respectively). This suggests that reporting and surveillance bias might be
influencing the number of reports, resulting in considerable year-to-year and state-to-state variation.
Surface Water
Two (8.0%) of the 25 drinking water-associated outbreaks during 2001--2002 were associated with systems
served by surface water (Figure 6), compared with seven (18.4%) during 1999--2000. Among the two
surface water-related outbreaks, one was an outbreak of copper poisoning (Ohio, 2001) related to a
distribution system deficiency, and one was an outbreak of giardiasis in a rural Colorado town during 2001
caused by the failure of a bag filtration system. The latter outbreak is the first associated with inadequate
treatment of surface water to occur in a community system since 1997, when an outbreak of giardiasis
associated with disinfected but unfiltered surface water occurred in New York (3). The last community
system-associated outbreak related to inadequate filtration of surface water occurred during 1995, when a
large outbreak of giardiasis was reported in New York (4). In contrast, during 1991--1994, eight outbreaks
(including a substantial outbreak in Milwaukee) were reported in community systems that used treated
surface water (5,6). The decrease in outbreaks associated with inadequate treatment of surface water sources
is likely attributable to increasingly stringent regulations for treatment of surface water. However, even with
the additional EPA regulations, outbreaks might still occur. For example, in addition to the giardiasis
outbreak reported in Colorado during 2001, another limited outbreak of giardiasis was reported in a
Colorado resort during 1999--2000 (2); this outbreak was attributed in part to defective cartridge filters. The
Colorado outbreaks underscore the need for cartridge, bag, and other package filters to meet design
specifications and be properly installed if they are to be effective. All filtered systems, no matter what type
of filter is employed, should be adequately operated, maintained, and monitored to ensure reliable
performance.
During 2001--2002, no outbreaks were associated with the direct ingestion of untreated surface water,
compared with three outbreaks during 1999--2000. This is encouraging, because keeping the public aware
that surface water, despite its clarity, is prone to contamination by pathogens and should not be directly
consumed without being treated at the point of use or boiled, remains a priority. Manufacturers of point-ofuse devices and the National Sanitation Foundation provide information (available at http://www.nsf.org)
regarding different devices, instructions for use, and their ability to make water safe for human
consumption.
Groundwater
Of the 25 outbreaks related to drinking water, 23 (92.0%) were associated with groundwater sources,
compared with 28 (73.7%) during 1999--2000 (2). Of the 25 reported outbreaks, 10 (40.0%) were linked to
consumption of contaminated, untreated groundwater. During 1999--2000, a total of 17 (44.7%) of 38
outbreaks were associated with contaminated, untreated groundwater sources. Although outbreaks caused
by the use of untreated groundwater decreased during 2001--2002, the largest proportion of groundwater
outbreaks during this period remained attributable to untreated water systems, and untreated groundwater
remains a primary cause of outbreaks, especially in private, individual water systems that are not regulated
by EPA. During both the current and pervious reporting periods, half of the outbreaks attributed to untreated
groundwater were reported in individual water systems.

Treated groundwater systems can also lead to outbreaks; six (24.0%) of the 25 outbreaks during 2001--2002
were associated with treatment deficiencies of groundwater systems (including one outbreak in which
treatment was bypassed), compared with eight (21.1%) during 1999--2000. Four (66.7%) of the six
outbreaks associated with treated groundwater during 2001--2002 were reported in individual rather than
public systems, compared with one outbreak (14.3%) during 1999--2000. To safeguard the quality of their
well water, homeowners should purchase appropriately designed point-of-use devices and follow
instructions for operating and maintaining these treatment devices. Public health agencies can help by
providing educational materials about effective water treatment devices for private, individual water
systems. Although individual groundwater systems are not regulated by EPA, and public groundwater
systems (other than systems influenced by surface water) are not required to filter or disinfect drinking
water, efforts should continue to identify and remove possible sources of contamination and provide
adequate, continuous treatment for those systems that need treatment. Wells and springs must be protected
from contamination even if disinfection is provided, as groundwater can become contaminated with
pathogens that might overwhelm the disinfection process. EPA's proposed GWR (information available at
http://www.epa.gov/safewater/gwr.html) is expected to establish multiple barriers in groundwater systems to
protect against pathogens in drinking water from groundwater sources and should establish a targeted
strategy to identify groundwater systems at high risk for fecal contamination. The multiple barrier approach
should begin with protection of the wellhead, an assessment of potential sources of contamination, and
periodic sanitary surveys to ensure that wells remain protected. Periodic monitoring of source water is
necessary to identify water-quality deterioration, and adequate, continuous water treatment is needed for
wells that are identified as being vulnerable.
Of the 22 well-related outbreaks that occurred during 2001--2002, a total of 13 (59.1%) were associated
with community or noncommunity wells, compared with nine (40.9%) that were associated with individual
wells not covered by EPA regulations. This distribution, similar to previous reporting periods, is notable
because only public water systems will be directly affected by GWR, and thus protections offered by GWR
might not extend to individual groundwater systems. The quality of water in private wells and springs used
by private persons and nonpublic systems thus remains a public health concern; approximately 17 million
persons in the United States rely on private household wells for drinking water each year, and >90,000 new
wells are drilled annually throughout the United States (43). In addition, contamination of a private well is
not only a health concern for the household served by the well but can have an impact on households using
other nearby wells that draw from the same aquifer. EPA does not regulate private wells and will not do so
as part of the proposed GWR. EPA recommendations for protecting private water supplies are available at
http://www.epa.gov/safewater/pwells1.html. Additional efforts should be taken to educate well owners,
users, well drillers, and local and state drinking water personnel to encourage practices that best ensure safe
drinking water for private well users.
Deficiencies
During 2001--2002, the number of outbreaks associated with each different type of deficiency (untreated
surface water, untreated groundwater, treatment deficiency, distribution system deficiency, and
unknown/miscellaneous deficiency) decreased from levels reported during 1999--2000. In addition, each
deficiency type represented a similar proportion of the total number of drinking water outbreaks reported
during 1999--2000.
Water Systems
During 2001--2002, the number of outbreaks associated with each of the three different types of water
systems also decreased compared with 1999--2000 (Figure 6), whereas the proportion associated with each
type remained relatively consistent. The number of outbreaks associated with individual systems decreased
from 17 during 1999--2000 to 10 during 2001--2002, but still remained the most common of the three. Of

the eight outbreaks reported from Florida (the state with the most reported outbreaks, possibly reflecting
enhanced surveillance in that state), seven involved individual groundwater systems (the eighth involved a
community well system), which might have biased the results toward more individual (as well as more
groundwater) outbreaks; this again potentially demonstrates that outbreaks involving individual water
systems are the most susceptible to detection bias, given the limited number of persons involved, the
different levels of resources available to investigate these outbreaks, and the limited number of regulations
that govern these systems. The number and proportion of outbreaks attributed to individual systems during
1999--2000 was at a 15-year high and accounted for much of the overall increase in the number of
outbreaks reported during 1999--2000. The decline in outbreaks attributed to individual systems makes the
number and proportion of outbreaks associated with each type of water system more comparable with
reporting periods during the 1990s.
Etiologic Agent
The etiologic agent was not identified in seven (22.6%) of the 31 outbreaks reported during 2001--2002
(Figure 6). Although these seven outbreaks comprised the largest group of outbreaks, this was a marked
decrease from the number (17) and percentage (43.6%) of outbreaks of unknown etiology during
1999--2000. This likely reflects both the improved diagnostic capability of laboratories and better outbreak
investigations, resulting in more rapid and more appropriate specimen collection. Viral outbreaks (five)
comprised 16.1% of the total, an increase from the previous reporting period. This likely reflects rapidly
improving diagnostic capability for detecting norovirus in stool samples, a hypothesis supported by the fact
that all five viral outbreaks were caused by this agent. The five norovirus outbreaks affected by far the most
persons (727) of any single etiologic agent and caused more illness than all other agents combined. Parasitic
outbreaks (five) also comprised 16.1% of the total, similar to previous years. Among the parasitic outbreaks,
two linked cases of N. fowleri infection occurred in Arizona during October 2002, resulting in two deaths;
this was the first report of an outbreak of N. fowleri in the United States related to a drinking water system
(Appendix). This outbreak further underscores the need for treatment of groundwater, particularly in
geothermal areas in which these thermophilic amebae are likely to be amplified. Chemical outbreaks (five)
also comprised 16.1% of the total, an increase from the previous reporting period; these outbreaks highlight
the importance of proper maintenance of water systems, because four of the five resulted directly from
errors related to either recent maintenance work or to an improperly installed device. Bacterial outbreaks
(three) comprised 9.7% of the total, a decrease compared with the previous reporting period and the lowest
number reported since 1991--1992.

Conclusion
Data collected as part of the national WBDO surveillance system are used to describe the epidemiology of
waterborne diseases in the United States. Trends regarding water systems and deficiencies implicated in
these outbreaks are used to assess whether regulations for water treatment and monitoring of water quality
are adequate to protect the public's health. Identification of the etiologic agents responsible for these
outbreaks is also critical because new trends might necessitate different interventions and changes in
policies and resource allotment.
Surveillance for waterborne agents and outbreaks occurs primarily at the local and state level. Local and
state public health authorities should be able to detect and recognize drinking water-associated outbreaks
and implement appropriate prevention and control measures. Improved communication among local and
state public health departments, regulatory agencies, water utilities, and recreational water facilities would
aide the detection and control of outbreaks. Routine reporting or sharing of water-quality data with the
health department is recommended. Other means of improving surveillance at the local, state, and federal
level might include the additional review and follow-up of information gathered through other mechanisms
(e.g., issuances of boil-water advisories or reports of illness associated with agents thought to be

waterborne).
State health departments can request epidemiologic assistance and laboratory testing from CDC to
investigate WBDOs. CDC and EPA can be consulted regarding engineering and environmental aspects of
drinking water and recreational water treatment and regarding collection of large-volume water samples to
identify pathogenic viruses and parasites, which require special protocols for their recovery. Requests for
tests for viral organisms should be made to CDC's Viral Gastroenteritis Section, Respiratory and
Enterovirus Branch, Division of Viral and Rickettsial Diseases, National Center for Infectious Diseases
(NCID), at 404-639-3577. Requests for information or testing for Legionella should be made to CDC's
Respiratory Diseases Branch, Division of Bacterial and Mycotic Diseases, at 404-639-2215. Requests for
tests for parasites should be made to CDC's Division of Parasitic Diseases, NCID, at 770-488-7756.
Additional information is available from
EPA's Safe Drinking Water Hotline at 800-426-4791, on the Internet at http://www.epa.gov/safewater,
or by e-mail at hotline-sdwa@epa.gov;
CDC's DPD drinking water website at http://www.cdc.gov/ncidod/dpd/healthywater/index.htm;
CDC's Cryptosporidiosis Information Line of the Parasitic Disease Information Line at 888-232-3228
(voice system) or 888-232-3299 (fax system); and
for reporting WBDOs, CDC's Division of Parasitic Diseases, NCID, at 770-488-7756 or by fax at
770-488-7761; an electronic version of CDC's reporting form (CDC 52.12, rev. 01/2003) is available
at http://www.cdc.gov/healthyswimming/downloads/cdc_5212_waterborne.pdf.
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